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THE EXISTING CONDITIONS
The Habsburg &npire at the turn of the century was
afflicted with a malignant tumor -- the problem of national
minorities -- and the south Slav movement was the most prom-
inent infection. Slovenia and Croatia were economically and
politically dominated by the Habsburgs. Moreover, even their
neighbor to the south, Serbia, though po1itica~ freer, was
economically dependent on the Empire.
Croatia, an autonomous province within the Trans-
leithanian (i.e. Hungarian) half of the Empire, was permitted
a large degree of independence. Even though the Magyars
increased their repression, the Croat nobles attempted to
retain as much autonomy in their own affairs as possible,
maintaining local authority and controlling their own landed
1estates. In the attempt to maintain their autonomy, Croatian
nobles even asserted a tradition of Croat national independence,
2based on the tradition of the Zwoinimin crown. The political
situation did not become critical until the change in Hungarian
governors in 1903. During this time, Croatia, one of the most
privileged nations in the Empire, was also one of the most loyal
to the Habsburg rulers.
Conditions changed in 1903, when the semi-Machiavellian
governor of Croatia began to repress the Croats and to encourage
enmity between the Serbian sub-minority and the Croats. Because
- 2 -
of this treatment and the apathy of Vienna to Croatian
complaints, the politically articulate element in the province
increasingly lost confidence in the ability of the Imperial
government to correct the abuses of the royal Hungarian govern-
ment. The seizure of Fiume by Hungary inflamed the Croatian
nationalists as they regarded the city as historic Croatian
territory.3 As a result of the Magyar repression coupled with
the apathy of the Imperial government, Croatian interests made
common cause with the Serbian struggle for liberty and independ-
ence, a common goal. These Croatian interests were expressed
through the formation of various political parties.
In 1900, Stepan Radich founded the Croatian Peasant Party.
Its program consisted basically of liberation from Hungary and
land reform. The major weakness of Radich's party was its
seeming inability to do little but obstruct, and its reluctance
4to formulate clear and definite political goals. Another strong
party within Croatia was the Independent Democratic Party, re-
stricted to minority Serbs living within Croatia. This party
collaborated with Radich's Peasant Party on several occasions.
The third party was a form of Marxist party, under the influence
of Central European Marxists and Anarchists. This party was
severely repressed by the Magyars and had little influence in the
south Slav area. Their program called for increased political
freedom and the improvement of working conditions.
In 1908, the new royal governor, Paul Rauch, because of
anti-imperial speeches and debates, dissolved the Croatian
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legislative body, the Diet. New elections were held under
regulations limiting suffrage in the extreme, but the results
were unsatisfactory to him. The new Diet was dissolved and
Rauch governed by decree for two years. Elections were held
again in 1912, with the same result. The Croatian provinces
were thus under complete domination of the Magyar executive
official.
Driven together by Magyar injustice, the Serbian min-
ority in Croatia joined the Croats to cooperate in the
nationalist struggle. A council for independence as such did
not exist in Croatia; instead, the political parties had a
nationalistic point of view in their programs. Conditions in
Slovenia differed markedly from those in Croatia.
Slovenia had a fortunate position within the Empire, living
a contented existence under the Habsburgs. The Slovenes
carried on a full and fruitful political and cultural life and
local administration was frequently in the hands of Slovenes.
They were a very highly educated people, some scholars quoting
a 95% literacy rate. The "nationalist" goals of the Slovenes
differed fvom those of the Croats. Nationalism manifested itself
in Slovenia in a desire for continued and increased autonomy
within the Cisleithenian part of the Empire, not independent
national existence outside the boundaries of the Empire. Conditions
within 3lovenia were far different than in either Serbia or
Croatia. Slovenia had no independent historical or political
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tradition, but its national movement was based on ethnic
grounds. As mentioned previously, most Slovenes wished only
autonomy within the Empire.
The entire political life of Slovenia was marked by the
struggle between Clericalism and Liberalism. As in Croatia,
nationalistic desires were expressed through political parties.
The conservative Slovene People's Party was a powerful political
factor. Its leaders recognized the improbability of obtaining
sweeping reforms from the monarchy, but hoped some small success
could be achieved by allying with the conservative Catholic,
anti-liberal trend. Slovenia was an overwhelmingly Roman
Catholic country, and at one time certain influential figures
even proposed a Catholic union of states. Priests had long
cooperated with the peasants; the Clerical Party used this as
a basis for strong political power. The important fact however,
is that the tldjstinctcommunity of interests between Slovene
conservatives and their Croatian kin turned Slovene political
thought toward a concept of south Slav un1on1sm."5
Serbia was by far the most liberal of the three states in
the area of domestic political conditions. After the obliteration
of the Obrenovich family in 1903, new elections were held for the
Skupshtina or Serb legislative body. The 8kupshtina reinstated
the liberal constitution of 1889 and elected Peter Karageorgevich
king. The next few years were marked by the growth of civil
liberties and freedoms. In addition to the domestic changes, the
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murder of the Obrenovich family was followed by a great change
in foreign policy. Serbian government and politics became dis-
tinctly nationalistic and anti-Austrian. Serb antagonism
toward Austria was heightened also by the redrawing of the
Albanian borders, cutting Serbia off from the Adriatic Sea, and
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. From 1903 to 1914,
economic and political conditions improved and the country
enjoyed a general recovery.
Serbia, free of direct Imperial political control, was
at that time nevertheless economically dependent on the Empire.
This meant also political subservience to some degree. In 1901,
Austria-Hungary accounted for over half of Serbia's imports
and more than four-fifths of her exports. New Serb economic
ties with Bulgaria and political expediency led to the closing
of the Austrian borders to Serbian pigs in 1906. Serbia was
forced to search for new markets, and found them. By 1910,
6
Austria absorbed less than 33% of Serbian exports.
In Serbia, the land reforms of the more liberal King
Peter foreshadowed a fundamental change in the power of certain
parties. The Serb Radical Party is a good example of the new
ruling elite. Their influence in the government increased with
the passage of the new land reforms, accompanied by the decline
in the power of the landlord class.7 A splinter party, origin-
ating from the Radical Party, gave itself the name Serb Democratic
Party. Although the Radical Party gradually modified its program,
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tending to a more urban approach, the Democratic Party re-
tained its basic concern for the peasants.
Socialists were active throughout the period from 1900
to 1918, but particularly just before the war began. The major
political parties in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia were peasants
parties. Their leadership, centered in the cities, rested in the
hands of business and professional men. Even though the vote
was quite limited, the organization of the rnore liberal parties
reached to every level of society.8 The growing influence of
political parties, as well as the nationality problem, was in
large part a result of economic and social changes. These in-
creased the popular participation in the life of the state.
Serbian royalty was a very significant factor in encouraging
Yugoslav unity. Because of the existing conditions, many Croat
and dlovene political leaders felt a close kinship to the Serbs
and sought a south Slav union. A Yugoslav Committee was organized
in London 1915, having the support of various leaders from Croatia,
Slovenia, and Serbia.
In Serbia, the south Slav union idea had great support,
particularly from the monarchy. Serbia became the heir to the
Croatian south Slav movement when it became evident that such a
union could never arise within the Empire.9 In the drive for
a Greater Serbia, the Serbs also had received the support of the
Russian Pan-Slav movement and even the Russian government. The
victories of Serbia in the first Balkan War more than ever caused
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Belgrade to become the center of south Slav agitation.'O This
too was encouraged by the monarchy.
Because Slovene nationalism was directed toward autonomy
within the Empire, and Serb nationalism sought a Greater South
Slav Serbia, only Croatia had a truly pure nationalistic movement,
emphasizing complete national independence. Even so, the vast
majority of articulate Croatians wished their state to form the
core of a south Slav state. Unable to gain sufficient support,
the Croats cooperated with the Serbs for such a union. Thus, south
Slav attention focused on Serbia.
Although Serbia was able to break the Habsburg strangle-
hold on her economy, there was a more basic economic problem in
all three south Slav states. In Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia,
one problem stood out above all others -- rural, agricultural
overpopulation combined with low productivity and standards of
liVing.11 In many cases, the economic backwardness was a result
of foreign domination. The south Slav territories had become little
more than agricultural colonies which bought the industrial
products of the Austro-German regions.
A great problem, as elsewhere, was land distribution. In
Croatia, 50% of the land belonged to great estates. Of 414,000
families, only 75,000 owned above 20 acres. Over 340,000 (two-
thirds of the population) possessed only 7.3 acres. In 1900, ten
out of thirteen million owned no land at all.'2
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3erbia, the only one of the three states on which
adequate statistics are available may, for our purposes, serve
as a case study. Because of the tariff agreement with Austria,
signed in 1881 under duress, Serbian industry was stifled and
agriculture was dependent on Habsburg markets. The south Slav
lands were plagued by the need for agricultural reform and their
complete dependence on Austro-German capital for industrialization.
The social structure reflected the economic problems.
~ven the Pig's War changed the peasant's life very little as only
the market changed, and not any other part of the system. In
1910, 84% of the Serbian population was agrarian, 7% industrial,
5% governmental, and 4% engaged in trade. There VIas a huge
population explosion (71.3% in 32 years) and no satisfactory
emroigration safety valve. This overpopulation led to great
fragmentation of peasant lands. Where land reform did occur,
the peasant, freed from ancient feudal obligations, was suddenly
placed at the mercy of foreign and domestic markets.
Society was marked by an increasing gulf between the urban
and rural populations. Class stratification within the village
increased significantly. Oddly enough, there was a very close
relation between the Habsburgs and the oppressed classes. The
peasantry had often been protected by the Imperial officials from
German and Magyar persecution.13 The Balkan peasant view was
focused on his own interests: land, credit, and reduced taxes.
"Docility became political apathy, and suspicion was directed at
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town dwellers, officials, and politicians.u14 All in all, the
vast majority of south Slavs were primitive villagers, intensely
religious mdpolitically ~ost totally inarticulate before the
war.
After a reign of sixty-eight years, Emperor Francis
Joseph died in 1916. He was peacefully succeeded by his great
nephew, Charles. The new Emperor felt the problems of the
declining Empire could be solved. According to the biased
accounts of his secretary, Charles wished to alleviate the
15general poverty in his lands. Unfortunately, by accepting
the crown of Hungary, Charles made the solution of the south Slav
problem politica~ impossible, swearing to maintain the integrity
of the Hungarian lands. It must be said however, that the
Imperial administration made great attempts to solve the nation-
alities problem. It was the Magyar's conservative narrow-minded-
ness which must bear the brunt of the blame for the destruction
of the only reform plans for an Austrian federal system which
might have proven workable. On October 16, 1918, Charles
proclaimed a federal state. Faced with revolution, he signed a
renunciation of the throne on November 10, 1918. The Empire had
collapsed.
Almost a year earlier, in July, 1917, the Declaration
of Corfu had been signed. This declaration proclaimed the new
"State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." It was signed by the
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3erbian Premier, Pasich, and Dr. Ante Trumbich, the Croatian
President of the Yugoslav Committee. Radich, the leader of the
Croatian Peasant Party, supported the declaration with some
reservations. It was merely an agreement between the exiled
Serbian government and the emigr~ leaders to form a Yugoslav
state under the Karageorgevich dynasty. It is highly probable
that the declaration was made at this early time in order to
present a united and determined front to Italy, already demanding
Dalmatia (promised in the Treaty of London in 1915). Thanks to
the intervention of Woodrow Wilson and his refusal to recognize
that treaty, Italy did not achieve her goal. Thus, Yugoslavia
was born.
An attempted restoration of Charles to the Hungarian
throne occurred in 1920. After the bloody seizure of power in
January, 1920, by Admiral Horthy, elections were held to the
Constituent Assembly. The results showed a remarkable monarchist
majority as all leftists boycotted the election. Hungary
reverted to a kingdom with Admiral Horthy as regent. Charles
attempted twice to exploit the situation. The first attempt served
only to harden anti-Habsburg sentiment. The second time, in an
almost comical maneuver, Charles landed in the Burgenland in a
small plane to claim his throne. Admiral Horthy refused to
recognize Charles as the rightful sovereign and sent in a few
troops to disperse the attempt. Charles, as usual, had been
poorly advised. He and his wife, Zita, were deprived of their
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dynastie ri.~htsin Hun~ary.
Essentially, then, in Croatia and Slovenia following the
collapse of the ~mpire, a power vacuwn existed. This presented
the opportunity for the south 6lav uni.onists to step in and
achieve their goals. The political clirnate they encountered
was one of apathy, not opposition. In order to fulfill their
plans, these uni.onists had to change that condition.
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In the pre-war period in the south Slav areas, there
were two basic groups of leaders. The first group ~e those
of the Establishment, that is, the men who held the power
before 1895. Their power was as varied in nature as their
vocation, some wielding great economic power, either as huge
landowners or industrialists. ~everal of the Establishment
leaders controlled printed material -- books, newspapers,
pamphlets, and so forth. The high-ranking clerics of the
church and the royal family and nobles completed the member-
ship of the Establishment leadership. These people were leaders,
not by virtue of popular will, nor even personal ability, but
because of incontestable influence based on position, wealth,
or personal power over other leaders, i.e. a previously est-
ablished value position. Although certain exceptions did exist,
in general, the Establishment favored a slow-moving, semi-stagnant,
society. It rarely advocated radical or extreme political
points of view, and generally was to be found somewhat right of
center.
The other leadership factor in the south Slav area was
what may be called the popular group. Composed of men of
basically peasant background, this factor relied on the popular
support of the peasant masses for its influence. The men in
this group possessed a certain degree of charislna, drawing the
- 12 -
- 13 -
peasantry to them, although no one individual became the
"savior-symbol" for this,class. Though there was a great
variety in the degree of change they desired, and differences
in the speed with which they wished to carry out these changes,
all these leaders did favor, and called for, change in the
existing conditions.
Both groups of leaders shared some characteristics.
Among these was the fact that almost all had distinguished
themselves in one field or another, in publishing, business,
administration, organizing, and so forth. It was this dis-
tinction, among other factors, which made them leaders. More-
over, these men were extremely articulate, able to express well
their desires, demands, requests, arguments, and programs.
One characteristic shared by most of the leaders, was a feeling
of alienation from the society in which they had been born and
lived. This alienation caused in these leaders a feeling of
powerlessness, the idea that their actions or thought could
not and would not determine the outcome of events; furthermore,
the alienated leader was conftDnted with indecision as to what
he was supposed to believe. Finally, a sense of isolation, of
viewing as unimportant those goals or values which are regarded
highly in the society from which he originated, had a deep impact
on these individuals.
Of considerable importance in the selection of the leaders
.,' '(; < '.' " ... ",,\'''''1 I,.,'~'"was the extent of information accessible for reference. The
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specific examples that follow were chosen for their prominence
within their own country. Each is, to a certain extent, rep-
resentative of his type in that country. There is an effort
made to present men who represent significant factions within
the political spectrum and who exerted considerable influence
in political life.
The most influential politician in Serbia in the post-
1900 period was Nikola Pashich, born in Zajechar, a town about
110 miles southeast of Belgrade. Zajechar was a transportation
center, and located quite close to the Bulgarian border. There
is much coal in the area. Although little is known of his
family, they were well-to-do peasants, perhaps gaining their
wealth from coal mines on their property. Because of a good
mind and the ability of his parents to pay, Pashich was given
a good education, graduating in 1865 with high honors from
the University of Belgrade. His degree was in civil engineering.
His first assignment was to be sent for further study to the
University in Zurich. After a short stay in Zurich, Pashich was
appdbted municipal engineer in Prajevach. In 1872, after pol-
itical involvement, he joined the staff of the radical journal
"Radnik." In 1878, he was elected to Parliament. Pashich
founded and became the first president of the "Club of the
National Radical Party." Pashich, arrested in connection with
a peasant uprising in 1883, escaped, although many of his
- 15 -
colleagues were shot.
In 1889, he made a triwnphal return and was elected
Prestdent of the dkupshtina.. Pashich was prernier from February,
1891, to August, 1892, and served as ambassador in Russia
during 1893 and 1894. From 1901 to the end of the First \1orld
iliar,Pashich served as premier, except for two years (1904-1905)
as foreign !f]inister. Under his direction, negotiations with
the Yugoslav Committee were opened in 1915.
Pashich had great talents as a politician; he was grave,
taciturn, and politically shrewd, with an uncanny ability to
foresee trends and adjust his ideas and policies to them. iiJhile
studying in Zurich, Pashich associated with many Serb exiles.
At first, Pashich was greatly influenced by the Russian anarchist,
Bakunin, although the two disagreed violently on one point.
Pashich considered national liberation must precede social
revolution. Although this disagreement was deep, Bakunin and
Pashich remained good friends, Bakunin schooling the younger
man in Hussian radicalism, Western European socialism, and
liberalism.2 Contact with Bakunin produced a great love and
admiration in Pashich for both Russia and the Russian people.
In Zurich, Pashich and two other political unknowns joined
w,arkovich to form a party "which would strike at everything
old in Serbia, destroy the old, and lay foundations for the
3new edifice." From this statement alone, we can realize that
Pashich had been deeply alienated from conte~orary Serbian
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socio-political life. To seek to destroy the past in a culture
that is completely past-oriented represents a revolutionary
movement indeed 1 The party association lasted until the death
of Markovich. At that time, Pashich cut himself off from other
radicals and socialists. In 1878, he and forty-three adherents
were elected to the Skupshtina. He further strengthened his
political position by founding the Radical Party in 1881. Although
he based the Radical Party on peasan~ reforms, as his influence
increased and the party began to accept governmental responsi-
bility, it was more and more allied with the urban middle class
and professional classes. Pashich1s foreign policy did not have
the success however that his domestic programs enjoyed.
A devoted Russophile, Pashich's position was weakened by
the death of the Tsar in 1917. Formerly backed by Russia, Pashich
now negotiated with the Yugoslav Committee from a less powerful
bargaining position. His political career culminated in his
great influence at Paris in 1919. Pashich secured recognition
of the new Yugoslav state and realized almost all of Serbia's
territorial aspirations. Pashich, as many individuals of his
origin, was intensely nationalistic, even to the point of changing
socialist doctrine in order to achieve nationalist ambitions.
Information concerning Dragutin Dimitrijevich is meagre.
He first appears as a key figure leading the revolution in 1903
which resulted in the overthrow of the Obrenovich dynasty in Serbia.
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The conspirators of 1903 banded together in an organization known
as the ttNarodna Obrana." A group of extremists within the
"Narodna Obrana", led by Dimitrijevich, formed the terrorist
socIety "Uyedlnyenyi. ilj.Smrt", (unf.on or Death) or as Dlmi trj-
yevich referred to it, the "Black Hand.,,4 From the founding of
the Black Hand in 1908, to the summer of 1914, Di~riyevich's
influence in high army circles increased. By June, 1914, he
had placed members of the i30dety in all parts of the government,
and particularly in the Serbian General Staff. Dimitriyevich
informed Premier Pashich of a possible assassination in 1914,
but included no details. 'Nben the time to act arived, it was
the military which prevented any strong civilian intervention.
DimitriyeviCh waS of peasant origins, but abandoned his
family and friends for a military career. He engaged in secret
activities and intragovernmental spying for his superiors and
through their patronage rose to the rank of colonel, an
unusually high rank for a person of his class origins.
Dimitriyevich was known as a charming, ambitious, and intensely
secretive person. In the army these talents were put to good
advantage, as he was appointed head of Serbian Intelligence.
A rabid Pan-Serb, he was passionately patriotic and won the
devotion of the members of the Black Hand. He is representative
of the extremists so prevalent in Europea~ and particularly
Balkan, politicS at this time.
At Saloniki, in 1917, Dimitriyevich was arrested and a
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charge of attempting to assassinate Alexander was placed against
him. It is not clear whether the Black Hand conspiracy was
destroyed by a rival army and political clique, the ~hite
Hand, or if they were felt to know too much about the Archduke's
assassination in 1914.
As in the case of Dimitriyevich, information concerning
the6rly life of Jovan Ristich is scant. When the new ruler,
Milan Obrenovich, became king in 1872, Ristich was retained as
regent. He was again appointed regent for Milan's son in 1889.
He headed several cabinets during his career. Ristich joined
and soon led the Serbian Liberal Party, representing a tacit
alliance of the monarchy and the middle class. He took
advantage of the surge of peasant's and radical parties in
Serbian politics to bring together the monarchists and the
liberals, both fearing the rising power of these lower class
parties. The liberals represented the merchant and professional
classes, a minority of the intellectuals, and the lesser civil
servants. The policies Ristich followed were adopted by the
party, that is, a laissez-faire economy and a s~i-bellicose
foreign policy.
Ristich was an extremely astute politician. Desiring the
support of the Radicals in order to form a government, he released
their leader, Markovic, from prison. Ristich's political
strength waS undermined for a short time in the 1880's, having
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been associated with several bureaucratic scandals.5 He later
served as premier three times. In terms of political maneuver-
ability, Ristich may be considered a kind of Serbian Talleyrand.
He had an extraordinary talent for bringing factions together.
To many, he was not sufficiently anti-Austrian, although he
pursued a "Greater Serbia" foreign policy. Confronted with an
extremely unpopular monarch, Ristich tried every expedient
to stave off revolution. If this included peaceful and
friendly gestures to Austria, he was not hesitant to make them.
Ristich balanced his actions in foreign policy, bellicose enough
to satisfy the Pan-Serbs, and yet tactful enough to preserve
peace. Ristich provides a good example of a capable monarchist
toward the end of the nineteenth century, attempting to save an
unpopular institution.
Bishop Joseph strossmayer was born in Croatia in 1815.
He achieved considerable fame through certain brilliant sermons
given while court chaplain and rector of the Augustinian seminary
in Vienna. In 1849, he was appointed Bishop of Djakovo, a small
town in the monntains about 50 miles south of the Hungarian border,
thirty-five miles west of Vukovar. In this town he built a
majestic cathedral and dedicated it to union of the Eastern and
6western churches.
Strossmayer had many political and religiouS contacts high
in the Russian government and church. He went to Moscow On the
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occasion of the millenary of the baptism of Orthodox Russians.7
A critic of the Papacy because of its narrowness in regard to
church unity, he vigorously opposed and protested the Pope's
anti-Russian attitude at the time of the war in 1877, and
opposed the doctrine of papal infallibility.8
Older than the other leaders discussed here, Turkish
domination of the Balkans was more vivid in his mind. The
Austro-Hungarian Empire waS far more capable of preventing a
Turkish return than small, individual Slav states. An alliance
of Eastern and Western churches would immeasurably strengthen
Christianity throughout the Near East where it was threatened,
especially by the Turks and Arabs. In addition, a reconciliation
of the Roman and Orthodox churches would have facilitated the
union of, or at least closer ties between, Catholic Croatia
and Orthodox Serbia.
An ardent Croat nationalist, Strossmayer made broad
contributions to the development of education and literature
in Croatia.9 He founded the Croatian Academy of Arts and
Sciences as well as the Zagreb Art Gallery, not to mention numerous
schools, museums, and other places of learning. In all his
endeavors, Strossmayer attempted to give Croatia the leading
role. Although his political theories were often unrealistiC,
he made great contributions to all Slavic cultural societies.
He died in 1905.
Stepan Radich was born into a wealthy peasant family
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living on a seven acre farm near 8isk in 1871. Sisk is on
the Java River, south of Zagreb. It is a petroleum center, and
was a highly strategic area in the Turkish wars. The family
had eleven children. As in the case of Pashich, a good mind
and parental ability to pay assured a good education. Radich
was at home in every university and city. He wrote many books,
pamphlets, and articles.10 Banished from Zagreb because of
his political activities, Radich later returned to enter the
University. Here he organized nationalistically minded students,
was arrested, and again left the country. After a short stay
in Prague, he went to Budapest and entered the University there.
He was then twenty-four years old. In 1896, he entered the
University of MoscoW, and shortly after transferred to Lausanne.
Radich was a powerful Croat nationalist. He constantly
feared the expansionist tendencies of the 3erb dynasty, bureau-
cracy, and politicians. Thy party he founded worked diligently
to create an independent Croat Peasant Republic. The party
voiced well the grievances of the peasants and Radich's pacifistic
anti-militaristic views.
As a politician, Radich had an astonishing capacity for
changing his mind, and a complete inability to formulate clear,
concise demands. Because of his travels and varied education,
Radich was at ease when dealing with foreigners and accumulated
a broad awarenesS of the world beyond Croatia. This served him
well in political life. Radich persistently and resolUely
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attempted to politically educate and mobilize the politically
inarticulate masses slighted by the bourgeois parties.
Many scholars consider Janez Krek the most important and
convincing political leader the Slovenes have ever had. It
was his insight which perceived that any kind of Yugoslav
solution would give Slovenia a better chance for national
fieedom than continued existence in the Empire. Very little is
written about Krek. It is known that he was elected a deputy
to the Imperial Diet where the Slovenes were allotted ten per
cent of the seats. Their chief concern seemed to be the pres-
ervation of the Blovene national tongue. Krek, chairman of
3lav Philology at the University, was particularly well qual-
ified for this~task, so important to the Slovenes.
In one of his speeches as a Slovene organizer, Krek
expressed his desire for a south Slav union in this way: "All
our rivers flow toward Belgrade, and on to the Black Sea. Not
one flows toward Vienna. Follow the course of the river daval
Down to the Black ~ea, you will find peoples who are one with
11the Slovenes."
As one of the leaders of the Slovenes, Monsignor Korosec',
a Clerical deputy in the Reichstag, was the first to question
the right, publicly, of the Habsburgs to rule the Slav peoples.
During the War, Korosec' energetically agitated against requis-
itions for food and war loans. "A friend of the Ha:sburgs is an
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12enemy to his own nation."
On Hay 30, 1917, Korosec' read before the Austrian
Parliament a declaration that all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
be united into one autonomouS state. This text is known as the
gay Declaration or the "Hajska Deklaracija." In 1918, when
the national council of representatives of all Yugoslavs in
Austria-Hungary was organized in Zagreb, it was under the
presidency of Dr. Anton Korosec'.
Apart from the discussion of Korosec', it is of interest
to note that the agricultural cooperative system played an
important part in the economiC and political life of Slovenia.
These cooperatives were controlled by ~e Slovene People's Party,
and that in turn, controlled by the Catholics. This served as
as source of political strength to Korosec'.
From the discussion of these leaders, it is possible to
make several generalizations. The leadership in these three
states remained quite static from about 1890 to 1925. Change
occurred only by death. In Serbia, Pashich succeeded Markovich
in 1875, Korosec' followed Krek in Slovenia, and Radich was the
political heir of starcevich. Most of ~e leaders were well-
educated. Several had attended various universities and had
a broad educational experience. Many traveled a great deal in
Europe, particularly to Paris, MOSCOW, and Zurich. These three
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cities are particularly significant because they have been
traditional centers of revolutionary leaders. Zurich is noted
for its extensive freedom of speech. It is also important to
grasp the significance of their enrollment in foreign uni-
versities. Universities in the south Slav area were, in general,
conservative and rather narrow. Even in these educational
institutions, freedom of speech was limited. Little opportunity
for lively and critical debate existed and revolutionary
groups were not permitted. Thus, for higher education,
critics of the government and monarchy left the country.
Slovenia was an exception to many of these generalizations.
This state, having no real historical tradition, had also no
significant political leaders. On the other hand, it did have
an old and well-developed language and culture. This was
reflected in its leaders, most of whom were philologists or
clerics. Party development was unusually weak and leaders had
influence because they were well-known to the people, not because
they were organizers.
Each leader was passionate in his c~se, and most were
prolific pamphleteers and writers. These characteristics hold
true for the political elites in all three states, and tended not
to change during the period concerned. The leaders, most of
whom were of peasant origin, represented the middle income and
wealthy peasant classes, but for practical reasons allied with
other segments of society.
- 25 -
TIle leaders of peasant's parties were of peasant origin
themselves. Having left their country for education, they re-
turned to organize the peasants politically. In general, they
were intensely nationalistic, whether Croat, Slovene, or Serb.
Their chauvinism strongly influenced their party programs.
"Left-socialist" leaders did not, as in other countries,
formulate their own programs or theories, but traveled to other
European countries where leftist-radicals gathered and merely
copied their ideas, thoughts, and plans. There was little
or no independent and original Marxist-radical thought in the
south Slav area during this time.
The small faction of merchant and professional classes,
"the white collar workers," and their leaders allied with
moderate and progressive monarchists. Although these leaders
were also nationalistic, they were not averse to south Slav
union, if their national customs and traditions -- and their own
power __ could be preserved.
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For political scientists or historians, the language
of symbols is of great assistance in studying the power
structure of a specific society. The existence of certain
recurring, or key, symbols is an aid in identifying a pol-
itical atmosphere. All symbols are focal pOints for the
crystallization of sentiment. During the first two decades
of the twentieth century, the political atmosphere in Serbia,
Croatia, and Slovenia was saturated with the emotion of
nationalism. In the struggle for independence, each of the
south Slav nationalities turned to their past to recreate the
greatness which they again sought. What existed, then, in the
south 3lav areas, was a culture essentially historical in
nature, with its greatest symbols oriented around the past.
The past provided numerous symbols which were fitted to
the purposes of the political leaders. These included
memorial days, public places, songs, statuary, music, newspapers,
folklore, literature, and memorials. These were supplemented
by constitutions, party platforms, literature, and poetry.
When first examining symbols in post-1900 south Slav
culture, one is confronted with a large number of universal
symbols; that is, symbols which appeal to all elements of the
society. Among these were flags, monuments, certain popular songs,
poems, and so forth. In addition to possessing universal
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appeal, the above symbols are universally communicable.
Popular, even illiterate, participation and involvement with
them is high. A second, smaller category consisted of specific
symbols which were generally communicable to the educated
element of society. Within this group were those symbols
such as many poems, policy statements, constitutions, and stories
which~re popularized through newspapers or similar media.
Universal symbolS are associated with the general mass of the
people, whereas specific symbols relate and apply to the literate,
educated segments of society.
Several other factors must be taken into account in the
study of symbols. Distinction can be made between animate and
inanimate monuments; a further distinction between living and
dead animate monuments; and finally, the positive or negative
aspects of the symbols. The latter differentiation requires
exp~ation. A positive symbol is one which, when applied, evokes
emotions of love, patriotism, warmth, devotion, pride. A neg-
ative symbol, on the other hand, calls forth just the oppoSite
emotions __ hate or fear. Generally, groups supporting an
eXisting system use positive symbols and those seeking to over-
throw it use negative symbols.
The choice of symbols may be based on prominence, origin,
or type. The relevance of symbols as groups must be considered
as well as the order and limits of the groups. This includes
symbol users, i.e. political or class parties, and the political
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limits. In measur:i.ngthe significance of symbols, the in-
tensity of symbol utilization in a definite interval must
be considered, as well as the relative importance of the
symbol. Finally, the scope of distribution or effectiveness
of the symbols should be measured. Also, in the identification
of symbols, the extent of participation in symbolic action is
to be studied. Those effected and the extensiveness of
popular involvement are concerned here. The relation of symbols
and their use to th8 local culture is important.
There are, in the south Slav countries, several sig-
nificant inanimate monuments or symbols. Serbia offers three
examples, all of which mark the great push to the southeast by
the Slavs, particularly after liberation from the Turks. The
cathedral at Kraljevo waS built in the twelfth century. One
of the most beautiful monuments in Serbia, it was built at the
height of the old Serb empire by Stephan Nemanja, who later be-
1came St. Simeon. The birthplace of Constantine the Great is
a second great Serbian shrine. The city of Kragujevatz holds
special significance for the Serbs as the first capital of Serbia
2
after the liberation from the Turks in the middle ages.
A fourth symbol, and probably the most universal, was
the Serbian flag. The flag from 1867 to 1903 was a tricolor theme
~ack81 by the Obrenovich family crest. The double headed eagle
1s symbolic of the former ties to Austria, and the white cross
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is the papal cross awarded to St. Stephen for his assistance.
3
Again, the emphasis is on the past.
310venes were one of the first of the Yugoslavs to
create an independent state. The ancient city of Blatnigrad
became a symbol of that early independence. The installation
of the Duke on the Gosposvetskos field served to recall the
ancient practices and glories of the Slovene state. The Duke's
chair remains on the field as a monument.
4
In addition to the symbols of cloth and stone, were those
of flesh and blood. Many men, though long dead and forgotten,
came into prominence again in this period of intense nationalism.
A great 3erbian symbol in the struggle for political and clerical
independence waS the Patriarch Bogdanovich. He committed
suicide when the constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church
5was abolished in Hungary. Another Serb monument was Ivan
Mestrovich, a sculptor. This man became a leader of his race,
even a demi-god. In his work, he stressed the Serbian nationality
struggle in the face of Austrian tyranny. He chose historical
subjects for his works. Among his works are statues of Karulic
6
in Split, and Kraljevic in Belgrade. A third Serb was Vuk
Karadzic, the creator of a Serbian literary language and ortho-
graphy. In Slovenia, legendary King Nathias continued to exist
as a symbol of Slovene independence. The Hungarian governors
of Croatia, known as Bani, were continuous examples of repression
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and Hungarian domination. Finally, the Croat, Ljudevit Gaj
(1809 _ 1872), turned the idea of I11yrianism into a Croat ideal,
in opposition to Magyar policy after 1825.
7
In the pre-war period, men became monuments to their own
followers, or opponents, as the case might be. In Slovenia,
the Roman Catholic priest, Janez Krek, had a tremendous role,
not only in the nationalist movement, but also in ~e economic
and social work of the nation. The Croatian bishop, Joseph
Strossmayer, not only was a leader, but a symbol for the idea
of a Croatian state as the core of a south Slav state. He
dedicated his life to this cause. Finally, two Serb assassins,
Tukich and Princip, became beloved symbols in the struggle for
freedom.
There were also men who were negative symbols, who called
to mind tyranny and fear. In Croatia, Banus Paul Rauch came
to represent all the cruelty, stupidity, and narrowness of the
Hungarian government. General Varesanin, who kicked the corpse
of a young man after an assassination attempt, also became a neg-
8ative symbol. Even Count Michael Karo1yi became a symbol, one
of betrayal to all south Slavs.
The significance of a symbol is dependent on the way
it 1s used. The symbols mentioned previously were stationary,
known to most citizens only by word of mouth or through literat-
ure. The most effective symbols are those reaching the largest
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body of people. This chapter is a study of prominent examples
of symbols and the means of communicating them with maximum
impact.
Symbols may be communicated in two general ways, the first
involving personal communication. This includes every means of
oral transmission between one man and another, one man and a
group, or two groups. Ivlajorpublic pronouncements, party
platforms, debates, speeches, and rumor are all means of oral-
personal communication which utilize symbols to achieve their
purpose. The second method of communicating symbols is the
printed word.
All these methods were used in Serbia, Croatia, and
Slovenia. Because of the lack of modern means of communication ,
public speeches were the most widely used means of personal
transmission. Speeches by Tresic Pavicic, recorded in liThe New
York Times II described Austro-Hungarian atrocities -- such as,
9people digging their own graves. Bogdan Popovich, a pro-
fessor at the University of Belgrade, spoke many times of the
lack of understanding of Austria toward the south Slavs and
particularly toward the Serbs. Father Nikolai Velimirovich
preached and lectured on the sacrifices of Serbia over the
centuries so Europe could develop undisturbed by the Turks.
Speakers and other communicators sometimes consciously used words
like Magyar or KosSOVO or autonomy to incite the people. At
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other times, similar terms such as Catholic or Turk or
Constitution would be used.
Finally, party platforms and the debates of deliberative
bodies communicate symbols. Sometimes their mere existence, or
absence, may serve as a symbol in itself. The speeches and
deba tes of Ante 'rrumbich and M. Hinkovich in the south Slav10
Diets are repr.esentative of this means of communication.
The most effective means of communicating symbols are
words. Words and phrases become highly representative, giving
rise to extremelY high emotions. The question of how much
significance there is in any word, slogan,. or sentence should
be investigated. In all these forms, in the attempts to sway
opinion and popular sentiment, symbols are utilized. As stated
earlier, symbols crystaTIize sentiment and give rise to great
emotions and acts. Newspapers played perhaps the most import-
ant role in Serbia, croatia, and Slovenia. There were five
important newspapers in the south Slav area in the pre-war
era: "Srpska Rijcell in Sarajevo, "Dubrovnik" in Ragusa,
"Otadzbina" in Banjaluka, and "Narod" and ~usavat" in Hostar.
All five of these newspapers were particularly revolutionary.
The papers were filled with poems and exhortations, "imploring
the people to free themselves from the yoke of the foreigner.
Now is the time to die for the holy cause of liberty."ft
Not only were south Slav newspapers communicators of
symbols, but foreign newspapers also. As an example, essayist
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Torno durgentich wrote many articles for foreign newspapers, one
of which was It'fheNew York Times." Note the flavor of his
writing: "Little derbia will be found shedding its last drop
of blood for free democracy, a democracy that will never die, for
12
it is the mighty sovereignty, the will of the people."
Finally, the most effective media for the communication
of symbols was poetry and literature. The poetry was both
ancient and contemporary. Florence Earle Coates, although
a native American (Philadelphia Mainline), wrote one poem about
Serbia which was widely syndicated by the British. In close
liason with the Yugoslav nationalists, it is probable that the
British urged its printing in the Serbian newspapers because of
its great propaganda value and its appeal to the Serbs themselves.
These lines are from the poem "Serbia":
"Thou central martyr of the lvlonster-Crime,Who kept thy soul clear of the ooze and slime
The quicksands of deceit and perjury •••
Even noW, the thorny round that binds thy 13Bleeding brow is as a crown irradating lightl"
Much of the symbolism in these lines are recurrent themes in
Serbian history. The martyr idea is very strong in Serbia.
It was common feeling that only by Serbia's heroism and sacrifice
was Europe allowed to develop free from external invaders.
Serbia was protection from the Turks, Serbs dying in the holy
name and cause of Christianity.
Thus, in this poem the idea is continued -- Serb versus
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~lonster, the monster being at once Turk, German, Austrian, or
pagan. The poem not only calls attention to Serb martyrdom, but
its central posi.tion among all martyrs -- truly God's own
chosen. Symbolism in this poem makes the Austrian invasion not
only a military act -- but a monster crime -- against an inno-
cent and unprepared state. Serbia, Defender of the Faith, is
dragged from her pedestal by the monster crime, into the "slime
and ooze, th.equicksands of deceit and perjury." Thus, the
war becomes, in this poem, a holy war. As in centuries past,
Serbian blood flowed to protect Christian civilization. The
final testimony of her martyred fate is reference to the "thorny
<lDwn that binds that bleeding brow." Innocent of crime and
perjury, removed from slime and ooze of European diplomati.c
machinations, condemned by the Austrian pharisees, Serbia is
sacrificed. However, there is, as always, the great Serb
resurrection __ "Always there will be dawn." Serbia will again
arise: strong, triumphant over an eclipsed Austria. This
martyr symbolism occurs frequently in Serbian literature and
poetry. Symbols relative to this south Slav complex are calculated
for maximum identification and response.
In Hilan Rakitch's poem, "The Deserted Shrine," once
again the pathos of the martyr state expresses itself in the
symbolism of the church. Among the nations, Serbia stands alone ,
"and while gradual darkness falls on every side, with a swarm of
nightbirds, on their prey ident." The will of the people is unity
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to fight the war. ClaSs antagonisms are minimized, peasant
joining noble in the national struggle. "Gifts of old tie lords
and pious populous." To Rakitch, speaking of swarmS of night-
birds and vampires wheeling around, Serbia lies prostrate,
dying, and helplesS. Serbia herself is the deserted shrine;
in essence, Christ upon the cross. The symbols again are of
martyrdom and suffering for a holy cause. The shrine is an
ancient one, reminiscent of the long llistorical past of Serbia,
a past in which this same fate befell her. Unlike the previous
poem, in this example, there is no symbol, no suggestion of
resurrection. Serbia is "gone, defeated." "Endlessly awaits
14
the flock that ne'er is sent."
The incredible pathos of tITheDeserted Shrine" is con-
trasted by the hope and unconquerable spirit expressed in "The
dong of the Dead." After opening with several verses on the
transitory nature of life -- and hardship, those who have died
look back at Serbia and the people left alive. The dead, speaking,
symbolize not just the past generations, but also very ancient
past generations. "For thou art our fruit." All the past
generations come forward symbolically to sustain and comfort the
present generation. Mindful of vast changes in life, the dead
cry out __ "With the past do not strive."15
Finally, in an effort to wage the struggle against the
evils besetting the country, the present suddenly symbolizes all
the generations who have fought the holy struggle in Serbia.
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"Each step thou takest, beside thee we staY·10
Unnumbered to cO!1questwe bear thee along."
Another .31oveneexample of the use of symbo l.Lsm through
poetry is the "30nnet of Unhappiness," written at a time when
the idea of the Illyrian state waS still vivid. The suffocating
effect of foreign military, political, cultural, and economic
domination on everyday existence is the theme. "Life is a jail"
and "time the grim warden there." This poem, by France
Preshern, symbolizes the desperation, the hopelessness of
life in Jlovenia, its grief, its barrenness.
"Sweet death, 0 do not long forebear,
Thou key, thou portal, thou entrancing way
That guideth us from places of dismay.
Yonder where wages no pursuing foe
Yonder where we elude their evil piot~17
Yonder where man is rid of every woe. I
The foremost example of symbols regarding Serbian nati()nal
ajms and goals, :'iswell as traditions, is "The Battle of KOsovo,"
an epic ballad. This ballad is nationalistic in the extreme.
"There resteth to Serbia a glory, a glory that shall not grow
old." The symbolism is not necessarily in the meanings of words
or sentences, but in the total effect, particularly of the last
stanza. It commeC1orates all who have died for Serbian goals
and aims in the course of years.
"Or resteth a man in the land, so long as a
Blade of corn shall be reapt by a human hand,
30 long as the grass shall grow on the mighty
Plain of Kosovo.
~o long, so long even so, shall the glory of
Those remain who this day in battle were slain.,,18
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In songs, constant reference is made to Turks, symbol of
the great hatred and fear Existant in these people. The
national anthem of Serbia is a connecting bond between the
old and new 3erb empire. An appeal to God, it begs release
as in the past, from oppressors. "Hear thy Serb children's
voices, be our help as in the past." In this song, Serb extends
not only to nationality, but even to race. As so often in
3erbian poetry and literature, the martyr idea appears in symbol.
As the reader envisions the hordes of Austrians descending
upon Serbia, we hear IIfrom the slough of direst slavery, Serbia
19
anew is born. All our kin to God deliver." Thus, the God
who will surely free Serbia as well as the other Slav s~es, must
soon come.
There are three characteristics of almost all south Slav
poetry and songs. The first of these, already discussed at length,
was the martyr syndrome which rested on and within their culture.
It is an integral part of the south dlav culture to consider that
it was 3lav sacrifice which protected all Western Europe. Another
prevalent area of symbol emphasis was the connection with the
past. In poetry, literature, and songs, there were allusions to
former south Slav empires and great men, former great sacrifices ,
great events of the past. In writing at a time of serious peril
to their native lands, the south Slav poets and composers made a
positive symbol of the past, planting in the minds of the people
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a confid0nce a~d pride in their greatness unjustified in
Finally, the third category is the symbolization and
reference to the identification of the peasant with the
land. In almost every poem consulted, nature in the native land
is i.c1yllic,the bluest water, greenest grass, and so forth.
The manner in which this means of communica tion is used makes
it apparent that in the minds of the poets, the peasant class
was not alienated from the land itself, or from agricultural
existence, but only with repression, cruelty, and lack of a
coherent aprlcultural policy by the government.
o
It is possible that the intellectuals were creating a
dream world for one reason or another, and that these word
pictures they painted were not reflections of reality. The
motives of the poets seem unimportant however, because when
these poems were utilized for their symbol content by the pol-
iticians to sway the local social, religious, and economic
leaders to the nationalist cause, it was the picture which
was involved, not the motives of the poet. By using such poems,
the urbanized political leader reaffirmed to the peasant leaders
his interest in the peasant, the land, and natural beauty -- thus
re-establishing an important link.
In brief, three effective symbol categories have been
discussed. The symbols these categories represent will serve as
examples in the next chapter. clymbols in all their forms are the
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tools with which leaders build a workable political framework
in a country and maintain it. The choice of symbols is some-
times deliberate, often not. Those symbols which persist or
are not integrated are those which are effective, and lend
themselves most easily to manipulation.
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Numerous symbols are present in any given culture, but
unless utilized, they realize only a small part of their pot-
ential significance. dymbols realize this potential when em-
ployed in the process of political manipulation. Symbols
achieve their full potential when affecting individuals -- and
masses __ through consciouS and subconscious hopes, fears, and
emotions. This process of communicating symbols to an individual
or group of individuals with the purpose of persuasion may
be referred to as symbol manipulation.
The manipulator strives to create an artificial mental
environment in which individuals will form opinions and think
in accordance with his wishes. To achieve this goal, the mani-
pulator may sometimes employ the consistent exploitation of half-
truths, the exposition of any plausible lie, repetition, limit-
ation of available information, and argument simplification.
The manipulator is concerned with the multiplication of stimuli
best calculated to evoke desired responses and nullification of
1
stimuli likely to instigate the undesired responses.
This was the task confronting the south Slav political
leaders in 1915. Two segments of society were the objects of
propaganda, the elites and the apolitical masses.2 It is import-
ant to bear in mind the political status of the masses in the
south Slav lands. The term politically articulate indicates
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an individual who has some interest in the affairs of the
government, who participates in some fashion in the political
life of the state, and in most cases, is literate. To say that
even a bare majority of the peasantry 1n the south Slav lands
was politicallY articulate would probably be inaccurate. In
Serbia and Croatia, the number of illiterate peasants was bet-
ween 45 and 55 per cent. The majority formed their opinions
more through blind faith in their leaders than on any other
basis. These people were just one generation remo~ed from
the centralized, autocratic, monarchial government of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. In 1915, Croatia and Slovenia still remained
under the aegis of the Empire. The autocratic Obrenovich dynasty
had not been overthrown in Serbia until 1903. For the most part,
less than fifteen years had passed since all of the peasants
had been governed by governments in which they had almost no
voice. Taking into account the lack of extensive development of
communication and the general inability of the peasantry to
read, it would be a gross inaccuracy to claim that they were
politically articulate. Given this situation, the importance
of the local leader, whether political, social, economic, or
religiOUS, was greatly increased.
If the leaders :of the peasants could be persuaded to
support the south Slav movement, the political leaders could al-
most certainly count on the support of the masses. There were
two approaches open to the nationalists. The first was an indirect
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approach through newspapers, pamphlets, articles, and meetings.
The second was more direct. By the use of universal symbols
such as flags, poems, oratory, and others, large numbers of
the peasants could be involved in mass meetings. The enthus-
iasm of the crowds at meetings during festivals could in turn
be used as a further symbol in the effort to persuade the
leaders. This enthusiasm in crowds probably marked the high
point of IIpolitical articulation" for the peasants in the years
191 5 to 1918 •
The foremost goal of most political leaders in Serbia
and Croatia was to achieve independence for their particular
state or, at least, in the case of Slovenia, some sort of
autonomy. Even those desirous of Pan-Croatia or Pan-Serbia
recognized that independence from the Empire must precede
such aims. A secondary goal, but closely related to the first ,
was the achievement of greater national glory.
To accomplish these goals, the political leaders of each
state had to nullify or convert the opposition to such plans.
The chief opposition was composed of loyalists to the Austrian
Empire; however, the size of this group was extremely small.
Very little open opposition seems to have existed toward the
leaders and their individual nationalist programs. In Serbia,
loyalty was directed at the Karageorgevich dynasty; in Croatia,
at the Great croat ideal. In Slovenia, a somewhat unique condition
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existed. Having been extremely favored in the Empire, the
Slovene people remained somewhat loyal. The leaders however,
Korosec especially, were of the opinion that the possibility of
achieving 3lovene autonomy and cultural independence best lay
within the context of the south Slav movement.3 Croat
and Serb independence was the necessary precondition to the
fulfillment of that goal.
Thus, south Slav leaders in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia
had to mobilize the basically apathetic economic, religious, and
social leaders into active support in order to gain the inde-
pendence of their respective states from the Empire. For
the accomplishment of this goal, the political leaders needed
special tools, and these were symbols. The symbols discussed
earlier had the potential to perform this function in the south
4Slav area. These words, poems, and monuments «alled forth
emotion from the south Slav, appealed to his ancestors, his
religion, and his patriotism. It had to be the task of the symbol
manipulator to choose and employ those symbols which would
elicit those emotions. This chapter is a brief examination of
how these tools were employed. The fundamental premise from
wbich the political leadership worked was an emphasis on the
symbls of the long history and independent tradition and culture
or the south Slav.
The primarY' means ot direct propaganda in the south Slav
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states in 1915 were newspapers. The newspaper industry in
Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia was well-developed in the pre-
war years. The papers served as a government mouthpiece in
Serbia and were controlled by the dominant economic interests
there. Certain south Slav oriented newspapers existed in CrGatia
and Slovenia, owned by nationalistic Croats and Slovenes. Their
approach, for the most part however, was considerably more
moderate than the Serbian press due to the presence of Austrian
and Hungarian censors. In Slovenia, the nationalist news-
papers were small ventures, dependent on releases from Serbia
and Croatia for foreign newS. The bourgeoisie owners of the
newspapers were influenced by these releases, but also by personal
contact with cultural and political leaders who were desirous
of autonomy or independence. For the literate south Slavs in
Serbia and Croatia, newspapers were the sole source of reading
material.
The newspaper industry in the south Slav area was charact-
erized by certain outstanding features. These newspapers were
devoted more to sensation than to careful examination and report-
ing of the facts or news. It is well to remember that, as else-
where, the newspapers were commercial ventures and thus bound
to favor policies friendly to the economic interests of the
local.it7 or nation. ~s commercial enterprises, they expressed
the opinions of those men controlling the.purse strings. South
Slav editors generally-had little control over editorial policy
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which was directed by the dominant economic interests. These
interests included the coal magnates from eastern Serbia as
well as the great noble lan~owners throughout the three states.
A third factor involved in the publishing of south Slav news-
papers was their source of information. All but two or three
of the papers ~ere too small to maintain staffs in foreign
countries or distant localities, so depended on the major papers
in Belgrade for their information. These papers of course
slanted their point of vie~ in their releases. Thus, not only
did control of the Belgrade presS mean control of the press
throughout Serbia, but also control of the anti-Imperial press
in Croatia and Slovenia. The significan~e of this was not lost
on the south Slav leaders.
The newspapers represented a prime channel to publish
subjective opinion and viewS to the publiC; furthermore, editorial-
izing was not confined to the editorial page. The papers ut-
ilized background material to imply things for which they bad
no real evidence. They quoted from the press releases of the
enemy out of context, made appeals to legality, simplified
arguments, and finallY, made use of endlesS repetition to achieve
their purposes.'The south slav newspapers were constantly revolutionary
in tellor, usuallY extremist on every conflict between south 8lav
and Austrian. In 1907, five large newspapers called for revol-
ution. The papers made constant use of poems such as those
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discussed in the previous chapter, imploring the people to free
themselves from foreign domination. It is significant to note
that papers like 3rpska Riijec and Otadzbina were actually the
6
property of the Berbian government. Their editors were always
Serbs and editorial policy waS directed from Belgrade. All
of the Serbian presS was directed from the propaganda office
in Belgrade. The government control of newspapers in pre-war
3erbia was absolute and during the war, the censorship of
news was more total than anywhere else in Europe.?
If Serb newspapers were controlled by the government, it
1s essential to remember that nationalists like Pashich
controlled the government. Thus, the content of articles and
editorial policY was quite pan-Serb. Articles concerning events
of little real importance regarding Austrian success in any area
at the expense of Serbia or vice versa was exploited completely
out of proportion to the real situation. Feature articles on
events in Serbian history would appear, emphasizing the glories
of years gone by. Russia received extremely favorable coverage
by the papers. Logically, the control of the newspapers by
Pan-Serbs affected features, stories, and news presentation in
virtually every newspaper in serbia, as well as many in Croatia
and Slovenia all calculated to rouse an apathetic populAtion,
to a nationalist fervor. fhat pa~ticular quality of the Serbian
press, sensational15m, was put to great use.
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Descriptions by prominent citizens, such as Dr. Tresic
Pavicic, of atrocities committed during 1914 and 1915 by the
8Austro-Hungarian armies aroused sentiment. Father Nikolai
Velimirovic wrote articles on history, relating how all nations
were either saints or sinners, and it is not difficult to
discover which category Serbia fit.9 The papers de-emphasized
the importance of the outbreak of the typhus which nearly des-
troyed the Serb anny, and instead reported that a strong Serb
army faced only the remnants of those Austrians already once
defeated.
Statistics on the size and circulation of the south Slav
newspapers are sarce, but following are a few numbers indic-
ative of not only the phenomenal literacy rate in Slovenia, but
also of the typical size of such newspapers. By 1912, Slovenia
already had 122 newspapers. One of the largest was a weekly,
the Domolioub, edited for the peasants of Carniola, with a cir-
culation of 50,000. Another paper published in Slovenia was the
Slovensk1 Dom, with a circulation of about 28,000.10 These
papers consistently advocated that the extremely high level of
cultural and economic development of the Slovenes entitled them
to the right of national independence.
Russia, even after the Revolution, due to its importance
in all Slav affairs, received consistently uncritical praise
from the south Slavs. The paper, ~ Balkan, was quoted as
stating that "Russia, whether she be Tsarist or Bolshevist, is
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for the Serbian people, for all Croats and Slovenes.1I11 This
policy was not followed only in Serbia. In Zagreb, Rietch
announced that "our people have always believed in Russia. 'we
believed in Tsarist Russia. We still believe in Russia today,
not because she is Bolshevist, but simply because she is Russia.1I12
There were certain articles by well-known writers which
appeared in almost all south Slav newspapers. The populist
muckraker of the south Slavs was a Serb, Svetolik Rankovich.
The favorite satirist, appealing to scientists and scholars, was
~tojan Novakovich, while Bogdan Popovich was a popular
literary critic. The essays by these men usually agitated for
reform, and were quite often satirical.
The newspapers were the prime users of symbols. By the
use of word symbolS such as Turk, Constitution, Austrian, Inde-
pendence, Napoleoa and others, the editors could appeal to and
arouse the emotions of the reader, playing on his fears and
affections. Features and stories on anniversaries of great
victories [or defeats) and articles on great monuments could
accomplish the same purpose. Celebrating the creation of
Illyria, which marked at least partial national and political
unification and emancipation, & monument was bUilt to Napoleon
in Ljubljana. On it was inscribed the following: "Beneath
this stone we have placed ~b7 dust, Thou unnamed soldier of
Napoleon's army, that Thou mayest rest in our midst. Having
gone into battle for the glory of thy Emperor, Thou hast fallen
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13for our liberty." Newspapermen embodied current, contemp-
orary events in the appropriate symbols and achieved the aim
of the owner or editor. Also, many times in relating an event,
writers imposed value judgements, for example, 1n reference
to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, when speaking of the
assassin, the paper might refer to the patriot, Princip. This
type of phrase implied that not only was Princip a symbol of
resistance to Austria as a patriot, but also that what he did
was a patriotic deed. In times of hardship, the people were
rallied by refer.oces to places of great tribulation such as
Kossovo, to Napoleon, to former great heroes or men who acted
with great bravery in difficult times. All these methods
involved the manipulation of symbols in newspapers.
The newspapers played the most essential role in
gathering popular enthusiasm for nationalistic undertakings,
especially during the war years. The papers themselves reinforce
the accuracy of their writers simply by printing what they had
to say. Many newspaper readers considered that, if it was 1n
print, it must be true; moreover, the reader had a sense of
universality as he realized that just as he read that paper, so
did thousands of others. Finally, a newspaper can constantly
repeat items to reinforce already mentioned ideas.
Other means of manipulating symbols existed, but played
only a minor role in the national struggle of each of the three
states. In general, these would have appealed only to the small
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group of literate individuals. Among these were arts, theatre,
rumors, billboards, placards, and magazines. All of these means
of communication applied only to that group of literate- other,
means were necessary to reach the ignorant and illiterate peasantry.
In order to communicate symbols and gain the support
of the peasantry, universal symbols and appeals to the peasants
were mobilized on major holidays and festivals to stir nation-
alistic enthusiasm and recall old glories and triumphs. Perhaps
the most important means of communicating universal symbols
in the south Slav lands was the ballad.
Because of its importance in the life of the south
Slav peasant, the role of the ballad must be discussed further.
The tradition of Serbian balladry was of great importance as
a means of communicating universal symbols. Largely because of
the tremendous conflicts and migrations throughout Serbian and
south Slav history,since the thirteenth century, this area
developed an independent culture which was most vividly
expressed in its ballads. The transitory, struggling and nomadic
life of medieval Serbia made the development of a sheltered
written language and literature difficult. The poet-balladier
stood beside the mountain chieftain, always prepared to praise
the hero condemn the traitor, and lament the dead. Their,
songs were all the history the people could expect -- legend and
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14folklore.
Thus began in the middle ages the traditional oral
expression so characteristic of the south Slavs.
"There is a sad, simple and beautiful grandeur in
the cycle of Kossovo which causes that group of poems 15
to stand out as a supreme moment ,~ofEuropean balladry."
It was the Kossovo disaster in 1389 which opened the period of
great Serbian balladry. The first purpose of the Serb ballad,
as seen in this cycle, was that of an oral newspaper, a char-
acteristic evident even in the modern verses quoted previously.
In addition:
"It is in these ballads that the Serb nation trulylives. and the peasant soldiers who crossed the plain
of Ko~soVO with reverent awe in 1912 were completing
a ritual begun by the self-sacrifice of Tsar Lazar.n16
These ballads and verses were a ready-made means of communication,
naturally traditional, and so rich in symbolism. In the
twentieth century, ideas, causes, news, and courage were trans-
mitted to the peasant in basically the same way that they had
been passed on for six centuries.
There were three great festival days for the south Slavs-,
the 28th of June was the Vidov-Dan, the greatest national fest-
ival, the symbol of Serb hopes. Here the peasants wore small
crosses made from certain trees in order to bring them freedom
and ward off evil foreigners. A second great day was St. George's
Day, on Apr!l 24th; the third was St. Barbara's Day. At all
these events, traditionally three toasts were made -- to the glory
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of God, to the Holy Cross, and to the Trinity. In the post-
1900 era, a fourth was added -- a toast to freedom.1? At these
festivals, the peasants wore the costumes used during the time
of the great Serbian Empire of the middle ages -- for men, white
pleated skirts and short braided jackets. Women wore white
kerchiefs attached to their heads by a narrow dark band. The
peasants danced the national dance, the "kola," a serpentine
18formation, hand in hand, twisting and turning, in and out.
These festivals provided an excellent opportunity for
political agitation and meetings. A large body of mainly il-
11lteratepeasants gathered together to celebrate an event of
national or religious importance. This gathering provided a
chance for singing nationalistic songs and hymns, for reciting
traditional ballads. In this way, political articulation, in
its crudest form, was extended to the peasant.
We may speculate on the course of such a meeting on a
festival day, using those tools suggested above. The peasants
would all gather in the village square; while waiting for the
mator or some other notable to speak, the crowd passed the time
by singing probably songs about their homeland, their nation,
or perhaps theirmcestors. Someone might have stood and recited
lines from a traditional ballad or poem. The speaker would arrive
late, speak too long -- berating those who made life hard for the
farmer, i.e. the Austrians, and others -- and dwell on the greatnes:
of the nation. Finally, after he finished, more songs, ballads,
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and poems would follow until all became tired and the meeting
broke up. As we have seen, the leaders had consciously mani-
pulated s~nbols in such events.
In the effort by the leaders to arouse enthusiasm for
the separate nationalist movements, two basic segments of society
were approached. The first were the literate, educated upper-
class man and the middle class bourgeoisie; the second comprised
the superstitious, illiterate peasant. It was not opposition
in either group which the leaders sought to change, but only
their apathy. In view of the distinct division between the
groups, two different types of symbol manipulation were employed.
For the literate, newspapers and other written material were the
primary means; the illiterate were approached through meetings,
festivals, and other social events.
In the south Slav countries, the nationalist leaders were
in control of the political [popular] structure and parties in
each of the three states in 1912. Thus, all the means of symbol
manipulation were at their disposal. In Slovenia, because of
its autonomy, and in Serbia, this meant control of the press.
In Serbia, Slovenia, and especially Croatia, men like Radich
made use of public meetings and festivals. In part motivated by
hatred of Austria, Serbia gave secret assistance to Croatia and
Slovenia. By control of every source by which the citizen could
be informed in the south Slav area, nationalists achieved the
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ultimate goal of the symbol manipulator -- the creation of an
artificial mental environment. By the successful manipulation
of symbols, the political leaders convinced the economic, social,
and religious leaders, as well as the masses, to support
nationalistic programs and goals. A detailed examination of the
gradual success of this effort from 1915 to 1918 is difficult,
but certain observations are possible. The leaders did not
become quite active in promoting nationalism until the Balkan
Wars beginning in 1908. The strength of the nationalists
increased steadily in south Slav Diets and Skuptchinas from
1908 to 1914. Symbol manipulation from 1914, to the liberation
of the south Slavs from Austrian occupation in 1918, was carried
on either outside those lands by foreign nationalists, or exi.les,
whether individually, or as a provisional government. Some small
meetings were in all likelihood conducted in the small villages
and to~ns. The success of the nationalist leaders previous to
1914 and then covertly during the war, was manifested in the
popular support which existed in 1918 for the first time, a south
Slav union.
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It is evident that in the south Slav lands the danger of
a restoration of the Austrian crown after the war was minimal·,
indeed, there was very little fear of such an event. The
south Slav leaders recognized the Empire had collapsed because
of its inherent economic, political, and social deficiencies.
Thus, it is quite clear that the formation of Yugoslavia was
not a consequence of a persistent fear of Habsburg restoration.
Another important factor was that neither the United States
nor Great Britain would permit Serbian territorial aggrand-
izement in conflict with previous treaties and agreements.
It was not a fear of Habsburg restoration which motivated the
south Slav leaders, particularly Serbian, but the fear of
Italian territorial aggrandizement as promised in the Treaty
of London in 1915. Without the aid of Russia at the council
table, some kind of united south Slav image was necessary to
prevent such action by Italy. Pashich, in Serbia, was only
half-heartedly interested in a south Slav union. Fpr more
favorable to a Pan-Serb state, he did not make any signif-
icant effort for a Yugoslav state until Italy had announced
her intention to carry out the annexation of the territories
she had been promised in 1915.
Serbia could, through a south Slav union, not only prevent
Italy from gaining certain territories, i.e. Trieste, but
could claim such areas for itself, based on ancient Croatian
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claims. For purposes of aggrandizement and to prevent Italian
expansion, Serbian leaders, near the end of the war, pressed
strongly for a union. The predominance of Serbia at this point
became evident in the 1920's when strong independence movements
arose in both Slovenia and Croatia. The idea of autonomy and
independence which these two states had envisioned was frustrated
by the predominant strength of Serbia.
Having discounted interference from the former rulers
of any signi£icance, we must turn to the events and movements
within Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia as an explanation of
"why Yugoslavia?". These countries, even in 1918, were
still economically and socially backward. The vast majority
of the population were illiterate peasants, politically
inarticulate and apathetic. The bourgeoisie and the upper
classes had united with the monarchists (in Serbia) to form
liberal parties which favored an active foreign policy, but
supported the domestic status quo. The peasants, in those areas
wher~ they were at least semi-articulate, formed Radical and
peasant's parties. Unlike similar parties in other countries,
these were not revolutionary, but reform-minded. War presented
an opportunity to the political leaders to change that static
condition. In essence, the confliot provided an alienated
peasant leadership the opportunity to greatly accelerate the
developmental pace of a semi-stagnant society.
The political leaders in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia made
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a convincing case for independence, based on the ancient south
3lav traditions of culture, language, and history. It was
rather evident that neither Slovenia nor Croatia could
survive politically or economically as individual entities.
If, as is intimated, diplomacy was such an important
factor in 1918, we must question which function was served
by s~nbols and their manipulators. The manipulation of symbols
created a convincing case for union which was used by rolitical
leaders to sway or convert economic, social, and religious
leaders to the desired goal -- union. Popular leaders such as
Pashich and Radich were dependent on their positions as social
~nd political spokesmen for the peasants and other segments of
society for national power and influence. Without the support
of these groups they could not continue to help guide the
government. It therefore was the task of the leaders to make
their cause and goal of nationalism and finally Yugoslavism,
the cause and goal of the peasants and non-political leaders.
To accomplish this goal, they made use of newspapers, public
meetings, and literature to arouse, through the symbols
expressed in these media, a strong nationalist sentiment.
This was essential for the preservation of their power.
There are then, two factors irt the unification and
formation of the Yugoslav state. The first was the existence
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of an extremely articulate and realistic group of political
leaders in the south Slav states, particularly in ~erbia.
These men created, through the manipulation of symbols, active
nationalist feeling among other leaders and the peasantry.
Being political manipulators, they dealt in terms of the
possible. When, in 1918, individual national existence for
Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia became unrealistic in terms of
political stability and diplomatic possibility, the emphasis
was shifted to union.
The second factor involved primarily two of the great
powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. The leaders
of these two nations recognized the futility and unrealistic
nature of granting independence to such tiny states as Slovenia
and Croatia, with no recent history of independent existence.
Based on this realizatio~, the two powers pressed vigorously
for a south dlav union.
There is a second, less plausible, more theoretical
explanation of the events related to unification. It could
be ari~ed that the political skill of the political leaders
concerned occupied an insignificant role. Certain conditions
existed and the leaders merely followed a path to which there
were no alternatives. Toward the end of the war, it was clear
that Slovenia and Croatia had neither the political, SOCial,
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nor economic strength to exist independently. To grant them
autonomy within the new Austrian republic was politically and
diplomatically impossible. Also, to annex them directly to
Serbia was a violation of the principle of autonomy put
forward in the Fourteen Points. The only course of action
open to the political leaders was some form of union of the
south Slav states, with an guarantee of autonomy to Slovenia
and Croatia within such a state.
It is my conclusion that the explanation of the course
of events lies in a combination of the two points of view:
that the unification of the south Slavs was acoomplished
due not only to the limitation of alternatives by existing
conditions, but also to the political realism and skillfulness
of the leaders of the three states.
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